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I. INTRODUCTION 
Defending architects, engineers, and contractors against legal 
actions for purely economic losses on construction projects 
brought by parties not in privity of contract has become common 
in Minnesota.  However, this was not always the case.  In fact, this is 
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still not the case in many other jurisdictions of the United States. 
Minnesota’s current situation stems largely from its 
consideration of the economic loss rule.  This rule prohibits tort 
recovery when a product—or here, a construction project involving 
a combination of products and services—suffers damage, causing 
economic loss, but not causing personal injury or damage to any 
property other than itself.  The rule has been cited as “the 
fundamental boundary between contract law, which is designed to 
enforce the expectancy interests of the parties, and tort law, which 
imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby encourages citizens 
to avoid causing physical harm to others.”1
In Minnesota, architects and engineers are liable in tort to 
third parties, such as contractors, with whom they have no 
contractual privity.2  This article will examine the development of 
Minnesota’s treatment of the economic loss rule with respect to 
construction projects and, specifically, design professionals such as 
architects and engineers.3  This article criticizes Minnesota’s 
treatment of the economic loss rule and suggests that, at least in 
Minnesota construction law, contract law has unnecessarily 
drowned in a sea of tort.4
II. HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
Three cases form the modern foundation of the economic loss 
rule.  The most commonly cited case to initiate the discussion is 
Winterbottom v. Wright,5 in which the court refused to extend 
contract obligations to third parties.6  Lord Abinger based his logic 
on the “infinity of actions” and the “most absurd and outrageous 
consequences” that might ensue if the parties who were not in 
privity of contract were allowed to enforce contract obligations for 
purely economic losses.7
 1. Sydney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction 
Defects:  A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 894–95 (1989). 
 2. Prichard Bros. v. Grady Co., 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 1988). 
 3. This is not the first such critical examination.  See Larry D. Espel, Liability 
and Loss Allocation for Economic Losses in Construction Litigation Involving Design 
Professionals, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 132 (1987). 
 4. See generally E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
866 (1986) (coining the phrase “contract law would drown in a sea of tort”).
 5. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. Div. 1842). 
 6. Id. at 404. 
 7. Id. at 405. 
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In the second case, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,8 Justice 
Cardozo implicitly held that there was a responsibility on the part 
of the manufacturer of chattels—here, automobile tires—to the 
ultimate consumer based not upon the contract itself but upon the 
relation arising from the purchase and foreseeability of harm if 
proper care was not used in manufacturing.9  This “foreseeability of 
harm doctrine” has carried through to many of the cases in 
Minnesota. 
The final case emerged in 1931.  In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 
Justice Cardozo had the opportunity to once again discuss the 
economic loss doctrine.10  In his often-quoted statement, he 
expressed his concern that abandonment of the rule would expose 
parties to “liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”11  The Ultramares 
opinion arose out of an audit, which incorrectly certified that 
capital and surplus were intact when, in reality, the underlying 
corporation was insolvent.12  The plaintiff was a lender who had 
relied upon the audit in response to request for loans to finance 
the sale of rubber.13  Justice Cardozo started his analysis by 
recognizing that “[t]he defendants owed to their employer a duty 
imposed by law to make their certificate without fraud, and a duty 
growing out of contract to make it with the care and caution 
proper to their calling.”14  He went on to analyze as follows: 
A different question develops when we ask whether they 
owed a duty to these to make it without negligence.  If 
liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or 
blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath 
the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to 
a liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.  The 
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist 
in the implication of a duty that exposes to these 
consequences.15
 8. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 9. Id. at 1051. 
 10. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
 11. Id. at 444. 
 12. Id. at 442. 
 13. Id. at 443. 
 14. Id. at 444. 
 15. Id. 
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In recognizing the erosion of the privity barrier, Cardozo 
stated, “The assault upon the citadel of privity is preceding in these 
days apace.  How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite 
subject of juridical discussion.”16  Recognizing his earlier decision in 
MacPherson, he stated: 
In the field of the law of torts a manufacturer who is 
negligent in the manufacture of a chattel in circumstances 
pointing to an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to 
those using it thereafter may be liable for negligence 
though privity is lacking between manufacturer and user.  
A force or instrument of harm having been launched with 
potentialities of danger manifest to the eye of prudence, 
the one who launches it is under a duty to keep it within 
bounds.  Even so, the question is still open whether the 
potentialities of danger that will charge with liability are 
confined to harm to the person, or include injury to 
property.  In either view, however, what is released or set 
in motion is a physical force.  We are now asked to say that 
a like liability attaches to the circulation of a thought or a 
release of the explosive power resident in words.17
Interestingly, in Ultramares, Justice Cardozo wrestled with the 
erosion of the privity barrier and questioned whether his earlier 
ruling in MacPherson should be limited to personal injury or 
extended to property damage.18  As we know, the erosion of the 
privity barrier did indeed extend to both personal injury and 
property damage.19  As will be seen, Minnesota abandoned the 
economic loss rule as it applies to construction projects and design 
professionals, but may now be well-poised to reexamine its position. 
III. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
As the economic loss doctrine evolved under case law, the 
structure of construction contracts advanced in the commercial 
sector.  In fact, in the area of commercial construction, contracts 
utilized by the various parties to the construction project are 
extremely well developed; they define the scope of work obligations 
and limit the liability of the parties.  In a typical construction 
project, an Owner retains a Contractor and an Architect.  Typically, 
 16. Id. at 445.
 17. Id. (citations omitted). 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id. 
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the Architect then retains an Engineer.  In turn, the Contractor 
retains sub-contractors and material suppliers to supply material 
and labor for completion of the project. 
Numerous trade and professional organizations have drafted 
model contracts for use in the construction industry.  One of the 
most common is the American Institute of Architects (AIA).20  
However, contracts developed by the Engineer’s Joint Contract 
Documents Committee,21 the Associated General Contractors of 
America,22 the Design-Build Institute of America,23 and others are 
often used as well.  For purposes of this discussion, the focus will be 
on the contracts developed by the AIA. 
On a typical commercial construction project, significant time 
is spent negotiating the contracts between the various parties so as 
to adequately define the scope of work, liability, and limitations on 
liability of the various parties.  The contract between the Owner 
and the Contractor will consist of a construction contract AIA 
A10124 for lump sum contracts or AIA A11125 for costs plus 
contracts, along with definitions of cost and time of completion.  
Also, the parties will typically incorporate AIA A201 General 
Conditions,26 a multi-page document outlining the obligations of 
the parties.  The Contractor will then use standard subcontracts 
and/or purchase orders to enter into contracts with the 
subcontractors and the material suppliers.27  These contracts are 
typically coordinated so as to allow for review of provisions of the 
Owner-Contractor Agreement.28  The agreements also coordinate 
insurance coverage and bonding obligations.29
 20. The American Institute of Architects, http://www.aia.org (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2007). 
 21. The Engineer’s Joint Contract Documents Committee, 
http://www.ejcdc.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). 
 22. The Associated General Contractors of America, http://www.agc.org (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2007). 
 23. The Design-Build Institute of America, http://www.dbia.org (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2007). 
 24. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A101 (1997), available at  
http://www.hepc.wvnet.edu/resources/pmanualforms/ConstructionServices/AIA
A101-97AgreementBetweenOwner&Contractor.pdf. 
 25. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A111 (1997). 
 26. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201 (1997), available at 
http://www.engin.umich.edu/class/cee431/AIA/05.04.05_A201_SAMPLE_ 
encrypted.pdf [hereinafter AIA DOCUMENT A201]. 
 27. Id. at art. 5. 
 28. See id. § 5.3. 
 29. See id. § 11.1.1. 
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On the other side of the transaction, the Owner will enter into 
an agreement with the Architect—AIA document B14130—and the 
Architect will in turn enter into an agreement with its sub-
consultant for the various engineering disciplines.31  Again, these 
agreements are coordinated to allow for a pass-through of the 
obligations between the Owner and the Architect and the Architect 
and Engineers. 
The agreements prepared by the AIA are also themselves 
carefully coordinated to allow for clear definition of scope of work 
and responsibilities in virtually all areas and phases of the 
construction project. 
For example, the A201 General Conditions32 covers issues such 
as: 
 
• Ownership and use of drawings, specifications, and 
other instruments of service. 
 
• Information and services required of the Owner. 
 
• Owner’s right to stop work. 
 
• Payment of taxes, permits, fees, and notices. 
 
• Treatment of allowances by the Contractor. 
 
• Contractor’s construction schedules. 
 
• Documents and samples required to be present on the 
site. 
 
• Shop drawings, product data, and samples procedures. 
 
• Royalties, patents, and copyrights. 
 
• Indemnification (by the Contractor). 
 
 30. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT B141 (1997), available at 
http://www.designadvisor.org/pdfs/b141.pdf [hereinafter AIA Document B141]. 
 31. Id. at art. 1.1. 
 32. AIA DOCUMENT A201, supra note 26. 
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• Administration of the contract (by the Architect). 
 
• Claims and disputes procedures. 
 
• Claims for additional time. 
 








• Contingent assignment of subcontracts (effective upon 
termination). 
 
• Changes in the work. 
 
• Delays and extensions of time. 
 
• Payments and completion. 
 
• Certifications for payment. 
 
• Substantial completion. 
 
• Partial occupancy or use. 
 
• Final completion and final payment. 
 
• Safety precautions and programs. 
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• Uncovering and correction of work (either before or 
after substantial completion). 
 
• Acceptance of non-conforming work. 
 
• Governing law. 
 
• Successors and assigns. 
 
• Rights and remedies. 
 
• Tests and inspections. 
 
• Commencement of statutory limitation period. 
 
• Termination or suspension of the contract (both for 
cause and for convenience). 
 
States that reject the economic loss doctrine, such as 
Minnesota, apparently have overlooked the fact that parties to 
construction projects define their obligations in detail in their 
contracts.  The relationship between design professional, Owner, 
Contractor, and other third parties will depend on the nature of 
the project.  Traditional construction projects will operate 
differently than design-build fast track projects, which will in turn 
operate differently than a project utilizing a construction manager.  
The parties themselves are best able to determine their needs and 
negotiate the terms of their contracts accordingly.  General tort law 
should not be permitted to tamper with these contractual 
relationships. 
A careful review of the current standard contracts in the 
industry discloses that the standard of care for the design 
professional is not defined in the contract.  Similarly, the standard 
of care for contractors is not specifically defined.  This was 
intentional on the part of the organizations drafting the contracts 
because they wanted those contracts to essentially default to the 
standard of care that would exist at the time under the 
circumstances and in the specific geographic area.  This may have 
created confusion for lawyers and the courts dealing in 
construction disputes.  Since the contract between the Owner and 
8
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the design professional is silent as to the standard of care, the 
standard of care is ultimately determined based upon “the exercise 
of that skill and judgment which [sic] can reasonably be expected 
from similarly situated professionals.”33  This is the same standard 
of care that would be used to define the duty owed in a tort action.  
Thus, absent a definition of standard of care in the contract, the 
standard of care in a contract action and tort action are similarly 
defined.  As a result, confusion may have ensued as to the standing 
of any given construction case as a tort or contract action. The new 
AIA B101 Owner-Architect (2007 version) does, for the first time, 
contain a definition of the standard of care, which may alleviate 
this confusion to the extent it existed.34
IV. ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN MINNESOTA 
Based on this foundation of case law and private sector 
contract development, Minnesota, until the 1980s, generally 
recognized an economic loss doctrine.  A review of Minnesota’s 
case law on this issue starts with the case of Superwood Corp. v. 
Siempelkamp Corp.35  This Minnesota Supreme Court case dealt with 
a product liability dispute.36  The plaintiff, Superwood, purchased a 
hotplate press manufactured in 1954 by the defendant, G. 
Siempelkamp.37  According to the court: 
The press operated without problem from 1954 to 1975, 
when the cylinder on the hotplate press failed and could 
not be repaired.  On March 12, 1979, three years after the 
cylinder failed, plaintiff brought this Federal District 
Court action based on negligence, strict products liability, 
breach of warranty, and breach of contract.38
The damages alleged were all economic loss damages in that 
they comprised damage to the press itself and lost profits arising 
out of the press’s failure to operate.39  The federal district court 
granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion on the 
 33. City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978). 
 34. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT B101 § 2.2 (2007).  Note that the 
new B101 is the new functional equivalent of the old B141.  See AIA DOCUMENT 
B141, supra note 30. 
 35. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 160. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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contract and warranty claims on the grounds that the statute of 
limitations had run on those claims.40  The federal district court 
then certified three questions of “uncertain” state law to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.41  The first two questions were as 
follows: 
 
(1) Is the manufacturer of defective equipment 
(a press) strictly liable in negligence to the user of the 
equipment damaged in its property and business by 
negligent product manufacture, inspection, or 
installation supervision? 
(2) Is the manufacturer of defective equipment 
(a press) strictly liable in tort to the user of the 
equipment damaged in its property and business by the 
product defect?42 
 
The court initially observed that “[t]o answer these questions, 
[we] must determine whether economic losses arising out of 
commercial transactions are recoverable under negligence and 
strict products liability theories.”43  The defendant argued that the 
Minnesota Legislature enacted the Uniform Commercial Code44 
and that “to allow a tort action would circumvent the system of 
rights and remedies detailed by the legislature and the UCC.”45
The court reviewed one of the most frequently cited cases, 
which also serves as a common starting point for discussions of this 
area of the law, the California case of Seely v. White Motor Co.46  In 
Seely, the plaintiff attempted to recover the cost of repairs to a 
defective truck, the purchase price of the truck, and the lost 
business profits that resulted from the lost usage of the truck.47  The 
California Supreme Court recognized that permitting a strict 
products liability theory would undermine the law of sales and 
would not reflect terms of the contract between the parties.48  The 
Seely court held that economic losses could not be recovered under 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 160–61. 
 44. See Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 811, 1965 Minn. Laws 1290. 
 45. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d  at 161. 
 46. Id. (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965)). 
 47. Seely, 403 P.2d at 147–48. 
 48. Id. at 149. 
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strict products liability,49 and also indicated that even in negligence 
actions, the manufacturer’s liability does not extend to economic 
losses.50
At that time, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that 
“the majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue have 
followed the holding in Seely.”51  Recognizing that this was “a case of 
first impression in Minnesota,” the court went on to analyze the 
interaction of the U.C.C. with tort law and strict liability.52  The 
court recognized that the U.C.C. “clarifies the rights and remedies 
of parties to commercial transactions.  For example, specific 
provisions exist covering warranties, warranty disclaimers, liability 
limitations, and notice provisions.”53
In upholding the economic loss doctrine, Superwood held “that 
economic losses that arise out of commercial transactions, except 
those involving personal injury or damage to other property, are 
not recoverable under the tort theories of negligence or strict 
products liability.”54  The court thus recognized that the rights and 
remedies established by the U.C.C. should not be disrupted by the 
application of tort theories of recovery, at least as to economic 
losses arising out of the failure of the product itself.  Such loss of 
expectation damages are adequately addressed by an action based 
upon contract. 
In 1984, the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided Zontelli & 
Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk (Zontelli I).55  While portions of the 
court of appeals’ decision were reversed and remanded by the 
subsequent supreme court case Zontelli & Sons v. City of Nashwauk 
(Zontelli II), the court of appeals’ decision regarding the nature of 
the claim—that is, tort versus contract—was not overturned.  
Zontelli was a general contractor who constructed a municipal 
storm sewer project for the City of Nashwauk.56  The city’s engineer 
substantially underestimated the amount of concrete and other 
unsuitable materials that needed removal during construction of 
 49. Id. at 151. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 161. 
 52. Id. at 161–62. 
 53. Id. at 162 (citation omitted). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 353 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) [hereinafter Zontelli I], overruled in 
part by Zontelli & Sons v. City of Nashwauk, 373 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1985) 
[hereinafter Zontelli II]. 
 56. Zontelli I, 353 N.W.2d at 602. 
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the street project.57  The dispute centered on the amount of 
additional costs that would be permitted as a result of the 
significant difference in quantities.58  After a lengthy analysis of the 
contract provisions, the court of appeals determined that Zontelli 
was entitled to costs beyond those allowed under the contract 
because the extent and effect of the difference in quantities was so 
unusual as to not have been contemplated by the parties at the 
time of contracting.59  Of significance, however, are the decisions of 
both the court of appeals and, ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, concluding that Zontelli’s claims arose out of the contract.60  
The trial court previously concluded that the underlying nature of 
Zontelli’s claims lay in tort and therefore applied comparative fault 
principals under Minnesota Statutes section 604.01.61  The court of 
appeals addressed this issue as follows: 
While we can understand why the trial court wanted to 
apportion fault in this case, apportionment was not 
proper.  Regardless of the fact that some of Zontelli’s 
claims sound in tort, the basis of each claim is rooted in a 
contract.  The claim of breach of warranty is based on the 
estimates included in Zontelli’s contract with the City.  
Zontelli’s claim of negligence, a tort claim, requires proof 
of the existence of a duty of care flowing from Wallace to 
Zontelli.  Such a duty, if it exists at all, could only arise 
from the contract between Zontelli and the City or the 
contract between the City and Wallace.  Zontelli’s third-
party beneficiary claim is dependent upon the contract 
between the City and Wallace.62
The supreme court went on to cite Lesmeister v. Dilly,63 another 
case, which held “that it was error to submit the theory of 
‘negligent breach’ of contract to the jury, or to allow 
apportionment of fault either based on the pure contract or the 
‘negligent breach’ cause of action.”64  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Zontelli II quickly agreed that the City’s duty to reimburse 
 57. Id. at 603; Zontelli II, 373 N.W.2d at 756. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 605. 
 60. Zontelli II, 373 N.W.2d at 751. 
 61. Zontelli I, 353 N.W.2d at 604. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983). 
 64. Id. at 102. 
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Zontelli for extra work arose out of contract (not tort) and then 
analyzed the changed conditions clauses in those contracts.65
The economic loss doctrine suffered a fatal blow in the case of 
Waldor Pump & Equipment Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., Inc.66  
Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Associates (OSM) was an engineering firm 
that had prepared specifications for a municipal public works 
project,67 which included certain pumping equipment.68  The bid of 
Waldor Pump, a subcontractor, had been accepted by the general 
contractor of the project, but Waldor’s equipment—the Wilden 
Pump—was later rejected by OSM as not conforming to its 
specifications.69  Waldor Pump later contended that OSM was 
negligent in drafting the specifications.70  A jury found that OSM 
was negligent and awarded Waldor Pump $61,834 in damages.71  
OSM appealed from the judgment, arguing that the trial court 
erred in submitting the issue of negligence to the jury because 
OSM owed no duty of reasonable care to Waldor Pump.72  Waldor 
Pump was a subcontractor on a construction project and would 
have had no contractual privity with OSM.73  This case put the 
spotlight on the economic loss doctrine in Minnesota. 
 The Waldor Pump court first cited City of Mounds View v. 
Walijarvi74 for the following: 
OSM contends it is not liable in negligence to Waldor 
Pump because an engineer owes no duty to anyone absent 
a contract.  This position is contrary to the prevailing rule 
in a majority of jurisdictions, which recognizes the liability 
of those rendering “professional” services in situations in 
which the professional is negligent in the provision of 
services.75
The court continued, citing Larson v. Larson:76
The reasonable skill and judgment expected of 
professionals must be rendered to those who foreseeably 
 65. Zontelli II, 373 N.W.2d at 751. 
 66. 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 67. Id. at 376. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978). 
 75. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 376–77. 
 76. 373 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. 1985). 
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rely upon the services.  Therefore, OSM is liable in 
negligence to those who foreseeably rely on its 
professional services.77
Two problems arise with a review of the appellate court’s analysis in 
Waldor Pump.  First, City of Mounds View, as will be discussed below, 
does not stand for the proposition cited by the court of appeals; 
second, Larson has no relation whatsoever to architects’ and 
engineers’ professional services, and held the opposite, that the 
“professional” — a police officer—did not owe a duty.78
City of Mounds View involved an architect, Walijarvi, who 
designed an addition to the Mounds View city hall.79  Shortly after 
construction, the basement in the city hall building began to leak.80  
Mr. Walijarvi wrote a letter where he purported to guarantee that 
the design of the lower level would remain free of moisture; 
however, he also pointed out that damp basements were common 
and that the architect had not constructed the building and could 
not guarantee that it was built in accordance with the design 
specifications.81
The first issue faced by the Minnesota Supreme Court was 
whether the original agreement had been modified to include an 
express warranty when Walijarvi sent the letter.82  The court 
dismissed that argument primarily based on the fact that the 
original letter written by the city administrator was not in 
evidence.83  The court then turned its attention to whether an 
implied warranty of fitness resulted when the architectural services 
were provided.84  The court stated that “[t]he majority position 
limits the liability of architects and others rendering ‘professional’ 
services to those situations in which the professional is negligent in 
the provision of his or her services.  With respect to architects, the 
rule was stated as early as 1896 by the Supreme Court of Maine.”85
The court refused to extend the doctrine of strict liability to 
architects and engineers, instead holding: 
 77. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377 (citations omitted). 
 78. Larson, 373 N.W.2d at 288. 
 79. 263 N.W.2d at 421. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 421–22. 
 82. Id. at 422. 
 83. Id. at 423. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (referring to Coombs v. Beede, 36 A. 104 (Me. 1896)). 
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Because of the inescapable possibility of error which 
inures in these services, the law has traditionally required, 
not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that skill and 
judgment which can be reasonably expected from similar 
situated professionals.  As we stated in City of Eveleth v. 
Ruble: 
 “One who undertakes to render professional services is 
under a duty to the person for whom the service is to be 
performed to exercise such care, skill, and diligence as 
men in that profession ordinarily exercise under like 
circumstances.”86
Finally, the court in City of Mounds View stated: 
[W]hile it is undoubtedly fair to impose strict liability on 
manufacturers who have ample opportunity to test their 
products for defects before marketing them, the same 
cannot be said of architects.  Normally, an architect has 
but a single chance to create a design for a client which 
will produce a defect-free structure.  Accordingly, we do 
not think it just that architects should be forced to bear 
the same burden of liability for their products as that 
which has been imposed on manufacturers generally. 
 For these reasons, we decline to extend the implied 
warranty/strict liability doctrine to cover vendors of 
professional services.  Our conclusion does not, of course, 
preclude the city from pursuing its standard malpractice 
action against the architects and proving that the 
basement area of the new addition was negligently 
designed.87
Therefore, City of Mounds View stands for the proposition that 
strict liability in tort should not be extended to the Architect in that 
case, but, of course, the City, having privity of contract with the 
Architect, could pursue a breach of contract action against that 
Architect.88  The court does not further explain what it means by 
Mounds View’s right to pursue its “standard malpractice action 
against the architects.”89  Thus, it is questionable whether the court 
 86. Id. at 424 (quoting City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 302 Minn. 249, 253, 225 N.W.2d 
521, 524 (1974)) (citation omitted).  Note that the City of Eveleth specifically held 
that the Architect is “under a duty to the person for whom the service is to be 
performed” and does not extend liability to parties not in privity with the Architect 
or Engineer.  City of Eveleth, 302 Minn. at 253, 225 N.W.2d at 524. 
 87. City of Mounds View, 263 N.W.2d at 425. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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intended to conclude that a breach of contract action would be 
inadequate.  This statement appears to be dicta intended to 
reference the fact that Mounds View had a right to sue for damages 
arising out of Walijarvi’s provision of services inconsistent with the 
standard of care.  Minnesota has clearly recognized that the 
retention of an Architect is a matter of contract and the duties and 
limitations of the Architect’s services are described in the 
contract.90  Thus, the first case cited by the court of appeals to 
support its decision in Waldor Pump appears to stand for the 
opposite proposition to that advanced in Waldor Pump. 
The court’s reliance on Larson is also misguided.  In Larson, a 
police officer stopped an intoxicated driver for speeding and found 
marijuana and liquor containers in the vehicle.91  During arrest, the 
driver threatened that he would “get” the officer’s house.92  About 
two months later, the officer was selected to attend the Minnesota 
Police and Peace Officers Association Convention in Grand Rapids, 
Minnesota, and this fact was advertised in the newspaper.93  The 
police officer asked his brother, respondent Larson, to look after 
his home while he was gone.94  He did not tell his brother about the 
driver’s threat from approximately two months earlier.95  Shortly 
thereafter, the respondent entered the house and was blown out 
the door by an explosion and blast of flame; he sustained personal 
injuries as a result.96
Respondent Larson sued Officer Larson for negligence, 
claiming that Officer Larson should have warned him of the threat 
to his house.97  The jury found both police officer and respondent 
negligent, declaring the police officer seventy-five percent 
negligent and respondent twenty-five percent negligent.98  The 
police officer appealed, asserting that he had no duty to warn his 
brother of a “vague threat received some two months” earlier.99  
Larson held that because “it was so speculative and unforeseeable 
 90. Moundsview Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Buetow & Assocs., Inc., 253 N.W.2d 836 
(1977) (citing Kostohryz v. McGuire, 298 Minn. 513, 212 N.W.2d 850 (1973)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 289. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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that the threat would mature into harm, we conclude that the trial 
court should have held this as a matter of law that appellant had no 
duty to warn of such unforeseeable speculative danger.”100
This case dealt with personal injury, not economic loss.  
Furthermore, the basis for the decision in Larson had nothing to do 
with the provision of a professional service.101  Larson simply stands 
for the proposition that the existence of a legal duty is an issue for 
the court to determine as a matter of law.102  Still, even on that 
point, the court stated that “although we have stated that in close 
cases foreseeability may be for a jury resolution, the foreseeability 
issue in the instant case was clear and should have been decided by 
the court as a matter of law.”103
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Waldor Pump quoted 
Larson for the proposition that “the reasonable skill and judgment 
expected of professionals must be rendered to those who 
foreseeably rely upon the services.”104  Larson, however, simply does 
not stand for that proposition.105  Thus, it is difficult to determine 
how the court in Waldor Pump made the quantum leap from 
Superwood and its embrace of the economic loss doctrine to 
rejection of the economic loss doctrine in Waldor Pump. 
In its defense, the court of appeals in Waldor Pump addressed 
the Superwood decision.106  The court first determined that: 
[E]conomic losses are those resulting from the failure of a 
product performed to the level expected by the buyer.  
Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, 
Inc.  Waldor Pump’s damages resulted not from failure of 
a product, but from negligent provision of engineering 
services.  Superwood does not apply to commercial 
transactions involving the rendition of professional 
services if the transaction was not governed by the UCC.  
Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay Bros.                                                           
Co.  We do not read Superwood to limit the legal remedies 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (citation omitted). 
 104. Waldor Pump & Equipment Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., Inc., 
386 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 105. See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text. 
 106. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377–78. 
17
Coleman: A Critical Examination of Minnesota's Treatment of the Economic L
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
4. COLEMAN - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007  3:51:10 PM 
126 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
of individuals economically injured by the negligent 
rendition of professional services.107
In this statement, the court first relied on Minneapolis Society of 
Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Associates Architects.108  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court in that case did not analyze whether economic loss 
could result from the provision of engineering services.109  The 
court simply stated: 
Generally, “economic loss” has been defined as resulting 
from the failure of the product to perform to the level 
expected by the buyer and commonly has been measured 
by the cost of repairing or replacing the product and the 
consequent loss of profits, or by the diminution in value 
of the product because it does not work for the general 
purposes for which it was manufactured and sold.  The 
damages sought in this case by MSFA for removal and 
replacement of the brick and other consequential loss fall 
squarely within this “economic loss” definition.  As such, 
they were recoverable in contract, if at all.  Since the trial 
court ruled there was no breach of an express warranty 
and the jury found no breach of implied warranties, the 
rule of Superwood precludes their recovery in this case.110
Further, the court held: 
“[E]conomic losses” that arise out of commercial 
transactions, except those involving personal injury or loss 
to other property, are not recoverable under the tort 
theories of negligence or strict product liability.  Damage 
to the brick on MSFA’s curtain wall construction was not 
damage to “other property,” but such damages were 
recoverable, if at all, under the “expectation-bargain” 
protection of contract law . . . . In any event, we further 
hold that Hanley owed no tort duty to warn MSFA or its 
architects and construction engineers of proper design of 
the building walls because the architects and engineers 
knew, or should have known, the danger of spalling if a 
 107. Id. (citing Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, 
Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984); Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. Co., 
380 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)) (citations omitted). 
 108. Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354 
N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 
683, 687 (Minn. 1990).
 109. See id. 
 110. Id. at 820–21 (citations omitted). 
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recognized proper wall design was not employed in this 
severe weather area.111
The court in Waldor Pump attempted to draw a distinction 
between products and the provision of engineering services.112  
However, the “economic losses” arising out of the provision of the 
architect’s services typically will arise out of the failure of 
components of a building—that is, products—to perform as the 
Owner desires.113  In contrast, the court in Minneapolis Society of Fine 
Arts drew the proper distinction between property damage and 
“damage to other property.”  “‘[E]conomic losses’ that arise out of 
commercial transactions, except those involving personal injury or loss to 
other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of 
negligence or strict product liability.”114  Stated differently, the 
court held that economic losses resulting from a personal injury or 
loss to other property caused by the design or construction work 
itself are recoverable under tort theories of negligence or strict 
product liability. 
Waldor Pump then relied upon Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay 
Bros. Co.115 for the proposition that Superwood116 does not apply to 
commercial transactions involving the performance of professional 
services if the transactions are not governed by the U.C.C.117  As 
stated in Waldor Pump, “we do not read Superwood to limit the legal 
remedies of individuals economically injured by the negligent 
rendition of professional services.”118  Valley Farmers’ Elevator 
observed that Superwood did not address professional services 
 111. Id. at 822. 
 112. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377.  See Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts, 354 
N.W.2d at 822 (distinguishing between absolute product warrantors, architects 
and experienced engineers).
 113. See generally Barrett, supra note 1, at 914-17 (discussing the “sudden and 
dangerous” test, which permits recovery in tort for damage to the work product 
itself). 
 114. Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at 822 (emphasis added) (relying 
on Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) 
for the economic loss doctrine). 
 115. 380 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 
1987), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 
1990). 
 116. 311 N.W.2d 159, overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 
683 (Minn. 1990).  The Hapka court ruled that “[t]he Uniform Commercial Code 
controls exclusively with respect to damages in a commercial transaction which 
involves property damage only.”  Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 683.
 117. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 378. 
 118. Id. 
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because the question certified in Superwood only addressed a 
defective product.119  Relying on the Illinois case of Rosos Litho 
Supply Corp v. Hanson,120 the court observed that tort actions should 
be allowed against service providers—here Architects and 
Engineers—since the U.C.C. does not apply and thus a plaintiff 
would have no warranty remedy for economic loss.121  Of course this 
analysis ignores the contracts between the parties and assumes that 
a breach of contract action would be inadequate to address the 
plaintiff’s injury.  However, even with this observation, Valley 
Farmers’ Elevator determined that the plaintiff’s action involved 
primarily the sale of goods and was governed by the U.C.C.122  The 
court explained that “[t]o allow Valley Farmers’ to recast its claim 
under a negligence theory and thus evade the limitations provision 
of the U.C.C. would undermine the U.C.C. in the manner that 
Superwood was intended to prevent.”123
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not recognize the fact that 
Waldor Pump had adequate remedies under Minnesota law to file a 
bid protest against the owner.124  The owner, then in privity of 
contract with the engineer, could have brought an action against 
the engineer.125
To fully understand Waldor Pump, one needs to look behind 
the scenes at what Waldor Pump accomplished by circumventing 
the economic loss doctrine.  The bid that Waldor Pump submitted 
was for a municipal public-works project,126 for which Minnesota 
statutes govern bid protests.127  The bid protest statute specifically 
would have allowed Waldor Pump to recover only the cost of 
preparing the bid.128  This is because the public bidding process 
exists for the benefit of the public and is designed to assure the 
lowest priced products, equipment, and labor that can meet the 
design requirements.129  Due to the bidding statute, no direct action 
could have been maintained against the city for anything other 
 119. Valley Farmers’ Elevator, 380 N.W.2d at 877. 
 120. 462 N.E.2d 566, 572–73 (1984). 
 121. Valley Farmers’ Elevator, 380 N.W.2d at 877-78. 
 122. Id. at 879. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377. 
 125. Id. at 376–77. 
 126. Id. at 376. 
 127. MINN. STAT. § 471.345 (2006 & Supp. 2007). 
 128. Id. at subdiv. 14. 
 129. 73A C.J.S. Public Contracts § 14 (2002).
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than the cost of preparing the bid.130  Waldor Pump, by convincing 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals that the economic loss doctrine 
did not apply, was allowed to circumvent Minnesota bidding law 
and launch a direct action against the engineer, OSM.131  
Interestingly, the case states that “[t]he jury also found that OSM 
had violated Minnesota Public Bidding Law, but that the violation 
was not a direct cause of Waldor’s damages.”132
Notably, in OSM’s professional judgment, the coil spring 
feature at issue in the case had a rational purpose.133  In order to 
prevail on a bid dispute under Minnesota law, Waldor Pump would 
have to show that OSM prepared specifications excluding all but 
one type of product.134  As noted above, the jury found that 
although OSM violated Minnesota public bidding law, that 
violation was not a direct cause of Waldor’s damages.135  The 
analysis should have concluded at that point.  To allow otherwise 
permits the selfsame evils that concerned Justice Cardozo in 
Ultramares; that is to say, OSM was exposed to liability in an 
“indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class.”136
IV. TREATMENT OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN OTHER 
STATES 
Other states have treated the economic loss doctrine 
differently.  Indeed, one of the rationales behind the court’s 
decision in Waldor Pump was that “[The defendant’s] position [was] 
contrary to the prevailing rule in a majority of jurisdictions, which 
recognized the liability of those rendering ‘professional’ services in 
 130. See § 471.345 subdiv. 14. 
 131. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377. 
 132. Id. at 376.  The Waldor Pump case provides additional insight as to the 
facts underlying the dispute: 
The project’s specifications require that the pump be “self-priming” 
and use a “coil spring.”  The Wilden pump did not have a coil spring, 
but it was self-priming.  Waldor Pump claimed the only functional 
purpose of a coil spring is to render the pump self-priming.  OSM 
contends that a coil spring also “scours” or dislodges sludge from 
clogged pipelines.  Waldor Pump’s expert witness, Garr Jones, testified 
at trial that the Wilden pump conformed in all material aspects to the 
specifications and there was no reason to reject it.  Id. at 376 n.1. 
 133. Id. at 376. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). 
21
Coleman: A Critical Examination of Minnesota's Treatment of the Economic L
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
4. COLEMAN - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007  3:51:10 PM 
130 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
situations in which the professional is negligent in the provision of 
services.”137  That is not the case; according to an article published 
in 1991 in Construction Lawyer, “the economic loss rule is not an 
outmoded doctrine that should be applied only in product liability 
cases.”138
In fact, the economic loss rule “continues to grow in vitality and 
is now accepted in at least twenty-three jurisdictions.”139  In 1985, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he push to delete 
the restrictions on recovery for an economic loss lost its support 
and by the early 1940’s [sic] had failed . . . .  [I]t is an old sword 
that plaintiffs have here picked up.”140
Many jurisdictions hold that the economic loss rule bars 
recovery under a tort theory when the parties are acting under a 
contract and economic losses are the only damages.141  The Nevada 
Supreme Court discussed the application of the economic loss 
 137. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 376-77. 
 138. Luther P. House, Jr. & Hubert J. Bell, The Economic Loss Rule: A Fair 
Balancing of Interests, CONSTRUCTION LAW., at 29 (1991). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 
1985) (citation omitted). 
 141. See Alpine Bank v. Hubbell, 506 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Colo. 2007) (stating 
that Colorado's economic loss rule mandates that “a party suffering only economic 
loss from the breach of an express or implied contractual duty may not assert a 
tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care from tort law”); In 
re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D. Ohio. 2007); Cont’l 
Airlines, Inc. v. Mundo Travel Corp., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2006) 
(stating that economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for the breach of a duty that 
is founded solely on the basis of a contract); RLI Ins. Co. v. John H. Hampshire 
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 364 (D. Md. 2006) (finding that contractor’s surety could not 
sue university’s architect in tort for allegedly failing to detect that contractor was 
installing wall panels incorrectly); Sofi Classic v. Hurowitz, 444 F. Supp. 2d 231 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Waytec Elecs. Corp. v. Rohm & Haas Elec. Materials, L.L.C., 459 
F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D. Va. 2006); Millenkamp v. Davisco Foods Int’l., Inc., 391 F. 
Supp. 2d 872 (D. Idaho 2005); Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Roofing Co., 316 F. Supp. 
2d 1142 (D. Kan. 2004) (stating that under Kansas law, economic loss doctrine is 
designed to preclude plaintiffs from circumventing the law of contracts and 
seeking to recover in tort for what is in essence a claim for breach of contract); 
Me. Rubber Int’l v. Envtl. Mgmt. Group, 298 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D. Me. 2004); All-
Iowa Contracting Co. v. Linear Dynamics, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Iowa 
2003); City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836 (Haw. 1998); Young v. 
City of Plaquemine, 818 So. 2d 892 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Calloway v. City of Reno, 
993 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Nev. 2000); Plourde Sand & Gravel v. JGI E. Inc., 917 A.2d 
1250 (N.H. 2007); Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 05-0832, 
2007 WL 2459193 (Tex. 2007); Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 
2003); Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, 779 A.2d 67 (Vt. 2001); Alejandre v. 
Bull, 153 P.3d 864 (Wash. 2007). 
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doctrine in a class action lawsuit brought by townhouse owners 
against a real estate developer, a contractor, subcontractors, and 
the city,142 which arose from alleged defects in a townhouse 
development in Reno, Nevada.143  The plaintiffs complained “that 
their homes were built with defective roofing and siding that was 
responsible for extensive water damage from rain and snow.”144  
The claims included breach of express and implied warranties, 
negligence, strict liability, fraud, and misrepresentation.145  After 
some of the defendants settled, the district court granted the 
remaining defendants summary judgment.146  On appeal, the 
Nevada Supreme Court upheld application of the economic loss 
doctrine because the defective construction created only economic 
loss.147  Refusing to apply a foreseeability exception, the court stated 
that “foreseeability of damages plays no role with respect to the 
economic loss doctrine. Purely economic losses fall outside the 
purview of tort recovery, even if such losses are foreseeable.”148  In 
another instance, a Virginia court held that “[p]ursuant to 
Virginia’s economic loss rule, losses suffered as a result of the 
breach of a duty assumed only by agreement, rather than a duty 
imposed by law, remain the sole province of the law of contracts.”149
Wisconsin recently applied the economic loss rule to 
construction cases in 1325 North Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd.150  
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed that three principles 
underlie application of the economic loss doctrine.  These include: 
 
(1) to maintain the fundamental distinction between 
tort and contract law; 
(2) to protect commercial parties’ freedom to allocate 
economic risk by contract; and 
 142. Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d at 1262. 
 143. Id. at 1261. 
 144. Id. at 1261–62. 
 145. Id. at 1262. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1270. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Waytec Elecs. Corp. v. Rohm & Haas Elec. Materials, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 
480, 482–83 (W.D. Va. 2006). 
 150. 716 N.W.2d 822 (Wis. 2006). 
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(3) to encourage the party best situated to assess the 
risk of economic loss, the commercial purchaser, to 
assume, allocate or insure against that risk.151 
A.  Florida’s Treatment of the Economic Loss Doctrine 
One particularly interesting consideration of the economic 
loss doctrine arose in 1993 when the Florida Supreme Court 
examined the doctrine in Casa Clara Condominium Ass’n v. Charlie 
Toppino & Sons, Inc. 152  The defendant, Charlie Toppino & Sons, 
Inc., supplied concrete for numerous construction projects in 
Monroe County; the case involved homeowners who were suing the 
concrete supplier under a negligence theory for purely economic 
losses.153  The concrete allegedly contained a high salt content that 
led to rusting of the reinforcing steel in the concrete.154  The 
plaintiffs were condominium owners whose property suffered from 
badly deteriorating concrete, to the point that it was cracking and 
breaking off the building.155  The court squarely addressed the issue 
of whether the homeowners could pursue a direct negligence 
action against the concrete supplier for purely economic losses.156
The Florida Supreme Court started with an analysis of the 
economic loss rule set out in Seely v. White Motor Co.157  The analysis 
of Seely led the court to define economic losses as: 
damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and 
replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss 
of profits—without any claim of personal injury or 
damage to other property . . . . In other words, economic 
losses are ‘disappointed economic expectations’ which are 
protected by contract law rather than tort law. 158   
The court recognized the basic difference between contract 
law, which protects expectations, and tort law, which determines 
the duty owed to an injured party.159  The court went on to explain 
 151. Id. at 831 (quoting Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 
N.W.2d 842, 842 (Wis. 1998)). 
 152. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993). 
 153. Id. at 1245. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1245–46 (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 
1965)). 
 158. Id. at 1246. 
 159. Id. 
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that “[f]or recovery in tort there must be a showing of harm above 
and beyond disappointed expectations.  A buyer’s desire to enjoy 
the benefit of his bargain is not an interest that tort law 
traditionally protects.”160
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the 
homeowners were seeking purely economic damages.161  No one 
sustained any physical injuries and no other property, other than 
the structures built with the supplier’s concrete, sustained any 
damage.162
The Florida Supreme Court continued its analysis by reviewing 
strict liability in a product manufacturing setting.163  The court 
recognized that a manufacturer or producer of goods was liable 
under a theory of strict liability because “public policy demands 
that responsibility be fixed where it will most effectively reduce the 
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach 
the market.”164  The court further recognized that the “basic 
function of tort law is to shift the burden of loss from the injured 
plaintiff to one who is at fault . . . or to one who is better able to 
bear the loss and prevent its occurrence.”165
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the 
homeowners could rely on statutory warranties as well as a duty on 
the part of sellers to disclose defects.166  Moreover, the homeowners 
could also rely on the opportunity to inspect houses for defects 
before purchase.167  The court determined that the various 
remedies available to the homeowners “coupled with homebuyers’ 
power to bargain over price, [were] . . . sufficient when compared 
with the mischief that could be caused by allowing tort recovery for 
purely economic losses.”168  The court then held: 
Therefore, we again “hold contract principals more 
appropriate than tort principals for recovering economic 
loss without an accompanying physical injury or property 
 160. Id. (citing Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d. 324, 327 (Ill. 1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (citing E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
866 (1986)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1247 (alteration in original). 
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damage.”  If we held otherwise, “contract law would drown 
in a sea of tort.”  We refuse to hold that homeowners are 
not subject to the economic loss rule.169
VI. MINNESOTA CASES FOLLOWING WALDOR PUMP 
Like other states, Minnesota continued to grapple with the 
economic loss doctrine, a fact demonstrated by two 1987 cases.  On 
August 7, 1987, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided McCarthy 
Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc.170  St. Peter Creamery, Inc. (the 
Creamery) hired McCarthy Well Company, Inc. (McCarthy) to 
restore the Creamery’s artesian well to its original capacity.171  
McCarthy proceeded with the work, pulling a copper liner out of 
the well casing and attempting to clean sand out of the bottom of 
the well.172  The attempt, however, was unsuccessful.  McCarthy 
then exploded dynamite at the bottom of the well, increasing the 
flow of water.173  McCarthy billed the Creamery for $34,573.20, 
which included a charge of $8,329.45 for a new pump.174  The 
Creamery did not pay the entire bill and McCarthy commenced 
suit to recover the balance.175  Shortly after the commencement of 
the lawsuit, the pump’s shaft broke three times, and the Creamery 
subsequently hired a different company to install a new pump, 
which also broke.176  A later inspection revealed a hole in the well 
casing, and, as a result, the Creamery dug a new well and installed a 
new pump.177
The court first analyzed whether the Superwood decision would 
apply “so as to bar the [C]reamery from recovering economic losses 
under a negligence theory.”178  Here, the Creamery and McCarthy 
entered into a written contract to perform the work, which was in 
the form of an acknowledgement-of-order form sent to the 
Creamery.179  “The reverse side of the form contained an extensive 
listing of terms and conditions, one of which provided that the 
 169. Id. (citations omitted). 
 170. 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987). 
 171. Id. at 313. 
 172. Id. at 314. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 315. 
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‘contractor shall not be liable for . . . . Any other damage or liability 
of any nature whatsoever arising or growing out of the Contractor’s 
work hereunder.’”180
A jury found that McCarthy was responsible for seventy-five 
percent of the Creamery’s claimed damages.181  The Minnesota 
Court of Appeals upheld this decision and found the placement of 
the exculpatory clause in the contract was unconscionable and/or 
invalid because it was not limited to liability for acts of 
negligence.182
At the time, under Minnesota Statutes section 337.02, the 
indemnification clause was unenforceable: 
An indemnification agreement contained in, or executed 
in connection with, a building and construction contract 
is unenforceable except to the extent that the underlying 
injury or damage is attributable to the negligent or 
otherwise wrongful act or omission, including breach of a 
specific contractual duty, of the promisor or the 
promisor’s independent contractors, agents, employees, 
or delegatees.183
Thus, because the indemnity clause was unenforceable under 
Minnesota law, nothing prevented the Creamery from pursuing a 
breach of contract claim under its contract with McCarthy. 
Instead, the court analyzed whether the Superwood decision 
would apply so as to bar the Creamery’s ability to bring a 
negligence action against McCarthy, even though it appears there 
was no reason to do so.184  The supreme court first observed that, 
“[a]lthough we did not define ‘commercial transaction,’ a review of 
our decision in Superwood shows that, as used in Superwood, a 
‘commercial transaction’ is a transaction governed by Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code . . . .”185  The court then articulated 
that “[t]he Superwood rule is premised on the existence of certain 
rights and remedies provided for in the U.C.C.. . . . To allow tort 
liability in commercial transactions would totally emasculate [the 
warranty and liability provisions] of the U.C.C.”186  The court 
 180. Id. (omission in original). 
 181. Id. at 313. 
 182. Id. 
 183. MINN. STAT. § 337.02 (1986). 
 184. McCarthy, 410 N.W.2d at 314. 
 185. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ch. 336 (1986)). 
 186. Id. at 314-15 (quoting Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 
N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) (alteration in original). 
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explained that “[t]he rationale behind the Superwood rule is that a 
recognition of tort actions in cases under the U.C.C. would upset 
the remedies contained in the U.C.C.; when the rationale is not 
applicable, i.e., when the U.C.C. does not apply, there is no reason 
for the Superwood rule to apply.”187  The court concluded by stating, 
“[a]ccordingly, we hold that ‘commercial transaction,’ as that 
phrase is used in Superwood, means a transaction governed by the 
U.C.C.  When the U.C.C. does not apply, the transaction is not a 
‘commercial transaction,’ and the Superwood rule does not apply.”188
Thus, McCarthy recognized that the statutory U.C.C. provisions 
should not be “emasculated” by converting the case to a tort action.  
The court opted not to analyze—as many other jurisdictions have—
the logic behind the Superwood rule as it would apply to 
construction projects.  Just as with the U.C.C., which “clarifies the 
rights and remedies of parties to commercial transactions,”189 the 
contracts between the parties in a commercial construction project 
also clarify the rights and remedies of the parties to commercial 
transactions.  Why should the contractually agreed upon rights and 
remedies in a commercial construction project be ignored and yet 
the rights and remedies to commercial transactions as described in 
the U.C.C. be allowed special protection?  Why is contract law 
allowed to drown in a sea of tort? 
VII.  REVIVAL OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
A. Briefly, the Prichard Bros. Cases 
In 1987, at the time the Minnesota Supreme Court heard 
McCarthy Well, the Minnesota Court of Appeals heard Prichard Bros. 
v. Grady Co. (Prichard Bros. I).190  The decision by the court of 
appeals resulted in a short-lived resuscitation of the economic loss 
doctrine as it applied to design professionals, but the decision was 
reversed the following year by the Minnesota Supreme Court.191  
This case arose out of the addition and remodeling of a school 
building for Independent School District No. 353 in Karlstad, 
 187. Id. at 315. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 314 (quoting Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162). 
 190. 407 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 191. Prichard Bros., Inc. v. Grady Co. (Prichard II), 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 
1988). 
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Minnesota.192  The School District and Grady executed a standard 
AIA contract as Owner and Architect, incorporating the AIA 
document governing general conditions.193  Prichard Brothers, Inc. 
was the successful low bidder as general contractor on the project 
and also entered into a Standard AIA Contract with the School 
District for the general construction of the project, incorporating 
the AIA A201 General Conditions.194  Due to a series of delays, the 
project was not completed on time and Prichard Brothers 
commenced a negligence action against Grady to recover increased 
costs and lost earnings allegedly caused by the delays.195  The School 
District was later brought into the action.196  Trial proceeded on 
three counts: (1) Architect’s negligence against Grady; (2) agency 
as to Grady; and (3) a claim against the School District for the 
contract balance of $25,465.197  “By special verdict, the jury found 
that both Prichard Brothers and Grady had been negligent, [and] 
that Grady was not acting as an agent of the School District at the 
time of its negligence . . . .”198  Prichard Brothers was entitled to no 
damages on the contract balance of $25,465.199  Liability was 
apportioned between Prichard Brothers (thirty-six percent) and 
Grady (sixty-four percent).200  The special verdict form indicated 
that Prichard Brothers suffered damages of $257,940, $165,081 “of 
which ‘were the direct results of the negligence of [Grady]. . . .’”201  
Judgment was subsequently entered for Prichard Brothers against 
Grady in the amount of $165,081.202
The single issue analyzed by the appellate court was whether 
the trial court properly allowed the case to proceed on a 
negligence theory.203  The 1987 Prichard Bros. I court of appeals 
decision is significant because it is one of the few Minnesota 
decisions that attempts to analyze fully the economic loss 
doctrine.204  The court started by identifying Prichard Brothers’ 
 192. Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 424. 
 193. Id.; AIA DOCUMENT A201, supra note 26. 
 194. Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 424. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 425. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. (alteration in original). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at 426 (discussing the inapplicability of tort theories to disputes 
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negligence claims against Grady that related to “1) preparation of 
the plans and specifications for a roof expansion joint and finish 
hardware; 2) interpretation of specifications and response to shop 
drawings submitted; and 3) inspection of the project site.”205  The 
damages awarded were for delays allegedly caused by Grady’s 
negligent interpretation of the plans and shop drawings.206  The 
court first quoted D & A Development Co. v. Butler by stating that 
“[t]o prevail in tort, it was necessary for Prichard Brothers to 
establish that Grady breached ‘some duty imposed by law, not 
merely one imposed by contract.’”207  Tort duties are independent 
of contract.  The again referenced D & A Development Co.: 
The fundamental difference between tort and contract 
lies in the nature of the interest protected.  Tort actions 
are created to protect the interest in freedom from 
various kinds of harm.  The duties of conduct which give 
rise to them are imposed by law, and are based primarily 
upon social policy, and not necessarily upon the will or 
the intention of the parties. . . . Contract actions are 
created to protect the interest in having promises 
performed.  Contact obligations are imposed because of 
conduct of the parties manifesting consent. . . .208
The court of appeals then got to the heart of the matter: “A 
definite conflict exists between tort and contract principles in the 
area of construction litigation.  At least one commentator has 
concluded that tort theories are inappropriate to resolution of 
these disputes, particularly where the parties’ duties are imposed by 
contract and represent negotiated limitations and remedies.”209  
The court recognized that the Minnesota Supreme Court “never 
where the parties’ duties are imposed by contract and represent negotiated 
limitations and remedies, and distinguishing between economic losses and injury 
to people and property). 
 205. Id. at 425. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. (quoting D & A Dev. Co. v. Butler, 357 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1984) (quoting Keiper v. Anderson, 138 Minn. 392, 398, 165 N.W. 237, 238 
(1917))). 
 208. Id. at 425–26 (citing D & A Dev. Co., 357 N.W.2d at 158 (quoting W. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 at 613 (4th ed. 1971) (alteration in 
original)). 
 209. Id. at 426.  See Martha C. Coleman, Liability of Design Professionals for 
Negligent Design and Project Management, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 923, 934–36 (1998) 
(citing Espel, supra note 3, at 132) (asserting that to permit parties to ignore 
privity requirements increases the likelihood that the wrong party will bear the 
loss). 
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squarely decided whether these types of claims for economic loss 
involving design professionals sound[ed] in contract or tort,” but 
that the court had been “disinclined to allow tort theories to 
supersede rules of contract law in other commercial settings.”210  
Prichard Bros. I further observed that “[r]ecent cases have rejected 
negligence or strict liability theories [for] the sale of goods and the 
provision of services [] involved, and have held that such cases are 
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code and the principles of 
Superwood.”211
The court was influenced by the fact that “[a]t various times 
during [the] proceedings, both Grady and the school district [had] 
argued that the gravamen of the complaint [is] strictly contractual 
and that the Prichard Brothers should not be allowed to convert 
[the] contract claim into a tort action.”212  The trial court rejected 
these arguments based on Waldor Pump.213  Recognizing the 
conflict, the court of appeals observed in Waldor Pump that “a 
design engineer owed a duty to a subcontractor to reasonably draft 
and interpret project specifications, and that the engineer could be 
liable in negligence to that subcontractor . . . .”214  The subcontract 
was considered “a third party who foreseeably relied on its 
professional services.”215
The court distinguished D & A Development Co.216 “on the basis 
that it only alleged breach of a contractual duty to complete plans 
by a specified date, while the engineer in Waldor Pump217 performed 
 210. Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 426.  See also Superwood Corp. v. 
Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) (holding that “economic 
losses that arise out of commercial transactions, except those involving personal 
injury or damage to other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of 
negligence or strict products liability.”). 
 211. Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 426.  See also Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. 
Lindsay Bros. Co., 398 N.W.2d 553, 556–57 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the 
transaction was governed by Superwood and the U.C.C.), overruled by Hapka v. 
Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 1990); McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter 
Creamery, Inc., 389 N.W.2d 514, 517–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that 
Superwood does not preclude the recovery of economic losses), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part by McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 
1987). 
 212. Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 426. 
 213. Id. (citing Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assocs., 
Inc., 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 214. Id. (construing Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377). 
 215. Id. 
 216. D & A Dev. Co. v. Butler, 357 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 217. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d 375. 
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its contract but breached a tort duty owed to draft specifications in 
a professional manner.”218  The court aptly observed that 
“[a]lthough Waldor Pump expressly states that a contract existed 
between the subcontractor and the general contractor [which] 
implies that a contract [] existed between the general contractor 
and the city and [also] between the city and the engineer, those 
contracts were not mentioned further.”219
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the school 
district’s argument that Prichard Brothers’ claim stemmed from 
contract was distinguishable based upon the facts of this case.220  
The court of appeals defined Grady’s duties by reference to the 
terms of the contract and found that Prichard Brothers’ claim was 
based on a breach of those contractual duties.221  The court of 
appeals declined to read Waldor Pump as holding that a cause of 
action necessarily exists in negligence where the parties’ duties and 
remedies are imposed by contract.222
Thus, the court of appeals held as a matter of law that the case 
was governed by contract rather than tort law.223  It was error to 
allow Prichard Brothers to circumvent its contract with the school 
district based on a vicarious liability or agency theory.  It was also 
error to hold Grady liable in tort where any duty he owed to 
Prichard Brothers was imposed by contract. 
The court of appeals could have pointed out that the 
framework for Prichard Brothers’ claim for delays and additional 
costs was contained in its contract with the school district.  The AIA 
General Conditions would have contained dispute resolution 
procedures, claim procedures, formulas, and processes for the 
calculation of additional costs and a timeframe for making such 
claims. 
The court of appeals, however, did not analyze the various 
provisions of the AIA General Conditions.224  For instance, it 
identified that: 
[b]y the plain language of the contract in this case, Grady 
is not liable for any interpretation rendered in good faith 
 218. Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 426. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 427. 
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which [sic] is consistent with the intent of and reasonably 
inferable from the contract.  Our review of the record 
reveals no evidence that would suggest that Grady did not 
act in good faith.225
The court also observed that no “evidence to suggest that Grady’s 
interpretations were inconsistent with the terms of the contract” 
existed.226  Thus, the court of appeals in Prichard Bros. I upheld the 
economic loss doctrine and did not permit a negligence action by 
the General Contractor against the Architect so as to defeat the 
economic loss rule.227  This decision analyzed and properly 
recognized the sanctity of the contractual scheme entered into 
between the Owner, Architect, and General Contractor.228
Prichard Brothers appealed the court of appeals’ decision to 
the Minnesota Supreme Court.229  In its short decision, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, without any real analysis, overturned 
Prichard Bros. I and dealt a blow to the economic loss doctrine.230
After discussing the decision in Prichard Bros. I, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held: 
It is our view that the McCarthy decision, to the effect that 
Superwood does not bar negligence recovery in service 
transactions, is dispositive and that the appellant 
Prichard’s claim against Grady is not barred.  It is 
unnecessary to determine the contractual relationship, if 
any, between Prichard and Grady and the “potential 
contract claims,” if any, which Prichard may have against 
Grady.231
The Prichard Bros. cases are quite significant.  To begin, 
Prichard Bros. I is important because the court of appeals—and the 
parties arguing the case—took the time to analyze the contract 
scheme that existed between the Owner, the contractors, and the 
design professionals.  The court of appeals recognized that the 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 428. 
 227. See id. at 427–28 (stating that there is no liability for any good faith 
interpretation reasonably inferred from the contract); see also id. at 428 n.2 
(reasoning that the jury instructions wrongly commingled the concepts of bad 
faith and negligence). 
 228. Id. at 424. 
 229. Prichard Bros. II, 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 1988). 
 230. Id. at 392. 
 231. Id. (referencing McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, 410 N.W.2d 312 
(Minn. 1987)). 
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contract scheme had been carefully negotiated and crafted and 
that the terms, conditions, and operation of those contracts should 
not be ignored or “emasculated” by converting the matter to a tort 
action.  Following Prichard Bros. I, the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Prichard Bros. II, with little analysis, found it “unnecessary to 
determine the contractual relationship, if any, between Prichard 
and Grady . . . .”232  No court in Minnesota seems to have offered an 
explanation as to why the carefully crafted contract scheme should 
be emasculated by a tort action. 
VIII. MINNESOTA IN THE 1990S 
A. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, the Case of the Bad Potatoes 
In 1990, the Minnesota Supreme Court was given another 
opportunity to analyze the Superwood decision and its progeny.  
Hapka v. Paquin Farms233 began with the Hapkas’ purchase of seed 
potatoes from Paquin Farms, which they then planted.234  “The 
planting process included cutting the potatoes into smaller pieces 
for propagation.  The machinery used for cutting and planting 
those seed potatoes was later used for cutting and planting other 
potatoes bought from a third source and planted in another 
field.”235  A state inspection discovered ring rot in the fields planted 
with the Paquin seed potatoes and also in the fields planted with 
the machinery used to plant the seeds from the third source.236  
Presumably, the machinery had been contaminated by the Paquin 
seed potatoes and thus had passed the ring rot on to the non-
Paquin potato fields.237  This distinction is critical because under 
Superwood, the original Paquin seed potatoes fields would have 
constituted “economic loss relating to the product itself.”238  But, 
the ring rot in the non-Paquin potato fields that was passed on by 
the machinery would have qualified under Superwood as “damage to 
other property.”239  It is necessary to recall that the Superwood court 
 232. Id. 
 233. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). 
 234. Id. at 685. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. at 691. 
 239. See id. at 686 (quoting Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 
N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981)). 
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held that “economic losses that arise out of commercial 
transactions, except those involving personal injury or damage to 
other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of 
negligence or strict products liability.”240
Hapka pointed out numerous state supreme and appellate 
court decisions that had wrestled with the “other property” issue, 
citing Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Associates 
Architects, Inc.,241 S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter 
Corp.,242 Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay Bros.,243 Thofson v. Redex 
Industries, Inc.,244 Holstad v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc.,245 American 
Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool & Machine, Inc.,246 and Agristor 
Leasing v. Guggisberg.247  After reviewing the decision in Superwood, 
the Hapka court criticized Superwood: 
Having set the stage for an exception designed to preserve 
the availability of tort remedies based on negligence and 
strict products liability in actions arising out of consumer 
transactions, the court instead carved out an exception for 
cases arising out of commercial transactions involving 
personal injury or damage to other property.248
Hapka then discussed the complete adequacy of remedies in 
the U.C.C. and pointed out that “[t]he Code itself indicates that 
the U.C.C. is intended to displace tort liability.  The Code contains 
 240. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162 (emphasis added). 
 241. 354 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. 1984) (“To hold that buildings constitute 
‘other property’ would effectively overrule Superwood as to every seller of basic 
building materials such as concrete, brick or steel because the ‘other property’ 
exception would always apply.  The UCC provisions as applicable to component 
suppliers would be totally emasculated.”). 
 242. 374 N.W.2d 431, 434 n.2 (Minn. 1985). 
The certified question indicates that in addition to personal injury, a 
‘nominal amount’ of other property was damaged. . . . We have 
previously recognized that to allow a party to sue in tort to recover 
substantial damages because of relatively minor damages to ‘other 
property’ ‘would thwart the policy implications of Superwood[]’ . . . .  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 243. 398 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. 1987). 
 244. 433 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“The loss of the Thofsons’ 
grain was the type of damage ‘which could ordinarily be contemplated by the 
parties to a commercial transaction.’  Accordingly, the damage to the grain did 
not constitute damage to ‘other property’ within the meaning of Superwood.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 245. 421 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 246. 767 F.2d 446, 447–48 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying Minnesota law). 
 247. 617 F. Supp. 902, 908 (D. Minn. 1985) (applying Minnesota law). 
 248. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687–88 (Minn. 1990). 
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provision for the recovery of incidental and consequential damages 
‘in a proper case.’”249  The court then drew a distinction between 
consumer transactions and commercial transactions.250  The court’s 
logic in this distinction was as follows: 
 Despite the U.C.C. provisions with respect to the 
limitation of remedies, Minn. Stat. §§ 336.2–701 to 336.2–
725 (1982), we continue to regard the Code remedies as 
something less than adequate in the ordinary consumer 
transaction.  Generally speaking, a consumer has neither 
the skill nor the bargaining power to negotiate either 
warranties or remedies.  If a defective coffee pot causes a 
fire which destroys a consumer’s home, the panoply of 
liability theory should be available to the consumer-strict 
products liability and negligence as well as breach of 
warranty—whether or not personal injuries accompany 
the property damage. 
 On the other hand, the law is entitled to expect the 
parties to commercial transactions to be knowledgeable 
and of relatively equal bargaining power so that warranties 
can be negotiated to the parties’ mutual advantage.  
Having negotiated the warranties and any limitations of 
liability, that a defective product causes damage to other 
property should not defeat the liability parameters the 
parties have set by opening the door to tort theories of 
recovery.  While there is reason to sacrifice consistency in 
order to preserve tort remedies for personal injuries 
arising out of commercial transactions, as well as those 
arising out of consumer transactions, there is no similar 
reason in cases of property damage arising out of 
commercial transactions to heap tort theories of 
negligence and strict products liability atop those 
remedies already available by the U.C.C.  Accordingly, in 
our judgment the Uniform Commercial Code must 
control exclusively with respect to damages in a 
commercial transaction which involves property damage 
only, and any statement or implication to the contrary in 
Superwood and its progeny is hereby expressly overruled.  
If the Code is to have any efficacy, parties engaged in 
commercial activity must be able to depend with certainty 
 249. Id. at 688. 
 250. Id. 
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on the exclusivity of the remedies provided by the Code in 
the event of a breach of their negotiated agreement.251
Justice Yetka dissented, stating that he would have allowed  
recovery on negligence theories with respect to the damage to 
“other property;” in other words, he would have permitted recovery 
on the potatoes planted in the non-Paquin potato fields that had 
been contaminated by the planting equipment.252  Interestingly, 
Justice Yetka also dissented in part in the Superwood opinion in 
1981.253  “I must dissent, however, to that portion of the majority 
opinion that concludes that the negligence of a manufacturer 
cannot be asserted by a commercial plaintiff as a ground for 
recovery of economic injury.”254
B. Minnesota Statutes Section 604.10 
As a result of continued litigation in the products liability 
arena, including asbestos cases, the Minnesota Legislature in 1991 
attempted to codify the economic loss doctrine in Minnesota 
Statutes section 604.10 for economic losses that arise from the sale 
of goods.  The statute stated: 
 
(a) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods 
that is due to damage to tangible property other 
than the goods sold may be recovered in tort as well 
as in contract, but economic loss that arises from a 
sale of goods between parties who are each 
merchants in goods of the kind is not recoverable in 
tort. 
(b) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods, 
between merchants, that is not due to damage to 
tangible property other than the goods sold may not 
be recovered in tort. 
(c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under 
this section does not include economic loss due to 
damage to the goods themselves.255 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 688–89 (Yetka, J., dissenting). 
 253. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162 (Yetka, J., dissenting). 
 254. Id. 
 255. MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1992).  Since 1992, section 604.10 has been 
expanded to include subsection (d) and (e): 
(d) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this section 
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In 2000, the Minnesota Legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes 
section 604.101, which provided additional definitions and limits 
on product defect tort claims and common law misrepresentation 
claims.256  This section limits tort actions to “economic loss that 
arises from a sale of goods that is due to damage to tangible 
property other than the goods sold.”257  Tort actions for damage to 
the goods themselves are not permitted and tort actions are also 
not permitted under the statute for sales of goods between parties 
“who are merchants in goods of the kind.”258  Unfortunately, 
Minnesota Statutes sections 604.10 and 604.101 were crafted for 
pure sales of goods transactions and did not contemplate 
construction projects that involve a combination of goods, services, 
and labor.  Whether a construction contractor is a “merchant in 
goods of the kind” is an open question, especially with respect to 
such components as concrete, structural steel, electrical wiring, 
switch gears, or an elevator.  Since the statute applies to “sale of 
goods” it would appear on its face to be inapplicable to services 
provided by architects, engineers, or other design professionals.259
Section 604.10 represents a positive step for the economic loss 
doctrine as it relates to construction projects to the extent that it 
recognizes the economic loss doctrine for “(a) Economic loss due 
to the goods themselves; and (b) Sales of goods between parties 
who are merchants in goods of the kind.”260
It appears, however, that the application of the economic loss 
doctrine to construction projects and their unique contractual 
scenarios is otherwise left to the courts to wrestle with in the years 
to come. 
does not include economic loss incurred by a manufacturer of 
goods arising from damage to the manufactured goods and 
causes by a component of the goods. 
(e) This section shall not be interpreted to bar tort causes of 
action based upon fraud of fraudulent or intentional 
misrepresentation of limit remedies for those actions. 
MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (2006). 
 256. MINN. STAT. § 604.101 (2000). 
 257. Id. § 604.10. 
 258. Id. § 604.10(a). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. § 604.10 
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C. Major Industries, Inc. v. Krech, Ojard & Associates 
In 2004, the Minnesota Court of Appeals again wrestled with 
the economic loss doctrine in the unpublished case of Major 
Industries, Inc. v. Krech, Ojard & Associates.261  Krech, an architectural 
and engineering firm, was retained to prepare bid specifications for 
a school project containing skylights.262  Major Industries was a 
skylight manufacturer that proposed use of its skylights to a bidder 
on the project, St. Germain’s Glass Co.263  However, after award of 
the contract, Krech informed Major Industries that its skylights 
were not “equal” and could not be used on the project even though 
they had been listed as an approved manufacturer.264  St. Germain’s 
used a competitor’s skylights that cost $4000 more than Major 
Industries’ skylights.265  Major Industries sued, and the trial court 
granted summary judgment for Krech on the grounds that Krech 
did not owe a duty to Major Industries.266  This case appears to be in 
sharp contradiction to Waldor Pump, and Major Industries appealed 
the dismissal of the tort claim on that basis.267  The court of appeals 
distinguished Waldor Pump and upheld the trial court’s dismissal of 
the negligence action.268  The basis of the distinction of Waldor 
Pump, while reaching a result consistent with the application of the 
economic loss doctrine, is interesting.  The court distinguished 
Waldor Pump as follows: 
Here, appellant was not bound to follow the specifications 
prepared by Krech because no contract yet existed.  In 
addition, there is no evidence that appellant changed its 
position as a result of the specifications; appellant does 
not allege that it had already manufactured the skylights   
. . . or that it passed up other work. . . . Therefore, Waldor 
Pump is distinguishable and the district court properly 
refused to extend its holding here.269
It appears the court found that no “reliance” resulted upon 
Krech’s services by Major Industries and that no damages were 
 261. No. A04-1052, 2004 WL 2940912 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2004). 
 262. Id. at *1. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at *4. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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proximately caused by such reliance and breach of duty.270  
However, Waldor Pump’s damages resulted in it being required to 
supply a more expensive pump as a result of OSM’s rejection of the 
Wilden pump.271  St. Germain’s also was required to supply more 
expensive goods, but apparently did not sue Krech.272  Thus, it 
appears that Major Industries is not based upon a recognition of the 
economic loss doctrine, but instead a failure to establish that Major 
Industries “forseeably relied” upon Krech’s services and a lack of 
damages proximately caused by Krech’s negligence.  Presumably St. 
Germain’s could have maintained an action against Krech for 
negligence following the rationale in Waldor Pump.273
IX. ECONOMIC LOSS IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
At least two arguments exist in favor of applying the economic 
loss rule to construction projects for purely economic losses.  The 
first arises from Justice Cardozo’s logic as articulated in Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche,274 contending that to allow parties to pursue purely 
economic losses based on tort theories in a construction project 
would expose parties to “liability in an indeterminate amount for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”275  The second is 
the application of the logic behind the Superwood decision that the 
parties on construction projects have already defined, typically in 
intricate detail, their obligations in their contracts between the 
parties and that those carefully crafted contractual schemes should 
not be defeated by opening the door to tort theories of liability.276
In Hapka, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the 
sanctity of commercial transactions between knowledgeable parties 
of relatively equal bargaining power.277  It is confusing, then, that 
such a rule would not apply to construction projects that contain 
detailed contract schemes outlining the rights, responsibilities, 
liabilities, and limitations of the parties.  The Hapka decision seems 
 270. Id. 
 271. Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assocs., Inc., 386 
N.W.2d 375, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 272. See Major Indus., Inc., 2004 WL 2940912, at *1. 
 273. See id. 
 274. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
 275. Id. at 444. 
 276. See Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 
1981). 
 277. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990). 
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to set the stage for the recognition by courts in Minnesota, 
consistent with other states, that purely economic losses arising out 
of commercial construction projects, except those involving 
personal injury, should not be recoverable under tort theories of 
negligence or strict products liability.  While some may think that 
this rule benefits design professionals and not contractors, it would 
clearly apply to both contractors and design professionals.  A 
design professional who incurs additional costs to remedy an error 
by a construction contractor is as able to sue the contractor directly 
in a tort theory as a contractor who has been damaged by delay or 
additional costs due to errors caused by a design professional.  This 
rule would benefit all parties to commercial construction projects 
in that the contracts negotiated between the parties to a 
commercial construction project would not be emasculated by 
application of tort theories of liability.  The party who spends hours 
negotiating a detailed indemnification clause or limitation of 
liability or limitation on consequential damages should not have 
those provisions defeated by another party to the construction 
process who elects to bring an action based on tort rather than 
contract. 
A. What is the Status of the Economic Loss Doctrine Today? 
Even with Minnesota Statutes sections 604.10 and 604.101,278 
confusion still exists over the economic loss doctrine that will 
prompt debate and litigation in the Minnesota courts.  One issue 
that has not been addressed in this article is the original pleading 
of construction cases.  To date, Minnesota practitioners will 
commonly plead a construction case on multiple theories of breach 
of contract and tort action with attendant cross-claims for tort 
contribution and indemnity.  If Minnesota strictly followed the 
economic loss rule—meaning that parties to construction contracts 
should only be permitted to bring breach of contract actions for 
economic losses arising out of property damage—then clearly a 
Rule 12279 motion to dismiss the tort actions on the pleadings would 
be appropriate.  Tort actions in a construction case along with 
apportionment of liability and contribution and indemnity have 
simply become “convenient” for the courts and the practitioners.  
 278. MINN. STAT. §§ 604.10, 604.101 (2006). 
 279. MINN. R. CIV. P. 12. 
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Unfortunately, contract law should be granted greater respect than 
to be dismissed simply as a matter of convenience. 
X. CONCLUSION 
It is undeniable that the boundaries of contract law have been 
consistently eroded since Justice Cardozo authored his MacPherson 
opinion in 1916.280  Of significance, however, is that by the time of 
his Ultramares decision in 1931, Justice Cardozo was questioning 
how much erosion of the privity barrier was too much.281  Just as he 
questioned his decisions, it appears to be time for Minnesota to 
address the “definite conflict” that exists between tort and contract 
principals in the area of construction litigation as observed by the 
court in Prichard I.282  After Waldor Pump, Minnesota courts clearly 
wrestled with the boundary between contract and tort actions in 
both the Prichard Bros. cases and Hapka.  Perhaps some 
practitioners would argue that tort actions are necessary to allow 
apportionment of damages and contribution and indemnity 
theories.  While it might be somewhat inconvenient for a design 
professional or contractor to sue an owner—the party with whom 
they are in privity of contract—rather than each other, absolutely 
no rational reason exists to defeat a carefully crafted contract 
scheme by such a direct action.  No reason exists that at trial the 
special verdict form could not be crafted as a breach of contract 
action.  While there would, by definition, not be a classic 
apportionment of damages, a jury could certainly determine the 
damages that naturally flow from the breach of contract by a party.  
In a breach of contract action, a damaged party is entitled to be put 
in the same position as if the contract had been performed.  Part of 
the confusion in construction cases is that multiple parties are 
typically accused of breaching their contracts and failing to 
perform their services properly.  There is no reason, however, that 
a jury cannot sort out damages as between multiple parties who 
have been found to have breached their contracts.  Contribution 
and indemnity actions are not entirely lost; a reading of the 
contracts between the parties frequently discloses rights to 
indemnification by and between the various parties to a 
 280. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 281. 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). 
 282. 407 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
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construction project.283  Clearly, the sanctity of contracts can be 
maintained while achieving results similar to the classic tort theory 
of damages apportionment, contribution, and indemnity.  Contract 
law should not have to drown in a sea of tort. 
 
 
 283. See AIA DOCUMENT A201, supra note 26, § 3.18. 
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